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Abstract 
All of the three major theories of the firm, i.e., the transaction cost theory, knowledge-
based theory and the entrepreneurship theory, offer some insightful analyses of the nature 
of the firm. However, they all have limitations and weaknesses in answering the 
fundamental question of the existence of the firm. In addition, they are all partial due to 
their particular focus on the multifaceted phenomenon of the firm. We argue that it is 
necessary and sufficient to develop a comprehensive yet integrative theory of the firm 
that combines the three competing yet complementary logics. Toward this end, we 
propose an aspirational community theory of the firm (ACT) as a candidate theory by 
conceptualizing the firm as an aspirational community, the core of which is a group of 
like-minded people sharing similar or same aspiration/vision. To explain the comparative 
advantage of the firm vis-à-vis market, we make a distinction between contractual labor 
and aspirational labor, the former being defined as services provided by a laborer in 
fulfillment of a contract while the latter as services provided by a laborer in pursuit of an 
aspiration; and argue that firms exist because while the market may be effective and 
efficient for allocating contractual labor it is less effective and efficient than the firms for 
allocating aspirational labor. 
  
Keywords: theory of the firm, transaction cost, knowledge, entrepreneur, aspirational 
community




The theory of the firm is important not only to economists but also to management 
scholars as Porter (1991: 95) points out that ‘any effort to understand success must rest 
on an underlying theory of the firm and an associated theory of strategy’. The 
fundamental question that a theory of the firm must answer is the existence of the firm 
(Coase, 1937), namely, why, given the market and its price mechanism, does the firm 
come to exist? According to this criterion, there are three major theories of the firm in the 
extant economics and management literature, i.e., the transaction cost theory, the 
knowledge-based theory and the entrepreneurship theory
i
.  
These three theories offer very distinct explanations of the nature of the firm and compete 
for supremacy. Each of them has a particular focus on the multifaceted phenomenon of 
the firm, making the field fragmented without an integrated theory. The transaction cost 
theories focus exclusively on reducing transaction costs of searching, contracting and 
monitoring. The knowledge-based theories put an emphasis on pursuing synergy derived 
from combined resources (i.e., knowledge, competences and capabilities) that create 
value. The entrepreneurship theories claim that the entrepreneur and entrepreneurship 
have a crucial yet oft-neglected role in the formation/existence of the firm. 
In the field of strategy (and more so, of economics), as Foss (1999) points out, there has 
been a tendency to adopt a methodologically ‘isolationist’ approach in conducting 
research in theory of the firm, namely, a methodological belief that either transaction cost 
logic or the knowledge-based view can develop a full-blown theory of the firm. Foss 
(1999: 742) argues that such an isolationist approach is problematic because the 
transaction cost theory and knowledge-based theory ‘as they stand presently both are 
handicapped in some, widely different yet important, respects’. Therefore, he supports a 
particular integrationist approach with both methodological and substantive arguments, a 
research strategy that aims at combining some key ideas of the existing theories, rather 
than pursuing to develop a single theory, which is almost impossible because of ‘the 
extreme complexity of the issues’ involved in the phenomena of the firm. 
This paper subscribes to this particular ‘integrationist’ approach and tries to develop a 
comprehensive yet integrative theory (cf. Casson, 2005). We argue such a theory is 
necessary and sufficient to build. It is necessary because all of the three aspects, i.e., 
entrepreneurship, cost reduction and value/knowledge creation, are but indispensible in 
the business organization we call the firm. It is sufficient because these three elements 
can be reconciled and combined with a conceptualization we propose of the firm as an 
aspirational community whose core members are the like-minded people sharing the 
same aspiration(s)/vision(s)
ii
 and in such a community the transaction costs are 
minimized while value/knowledge creation are maximized. 
The following text is organized as follows. In section two, we review the three existing 
theories of the firm by explaining and critiquing their unique answers to the question of 
the existence of the firm. In section three, we propose an aspirational community theory 
of the firm (ACT) and address the three questions a traditional economic theory of the 
firm needs to answer, i.e., the existence, boundary and internal organization (cf. Coase, 
1937) as well as the question of the competitive advantage of the firm a strategic theory 
of the firm needs to address (Foss, 1999). Section four concludes the paper and offers 
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managerial implications of the ACT theory. 
 
2. The three major theories on the existence of the firm 
As Barney (1996) points out, since there has existed a widely accepted theory of the firm 
(i.e., the transaction cost theory) in the organizational economics, anyone who attempts to 
propose a new theory of the firm would not only have to explain the existence of the firm 
but also have to explain why such a new theory is needed. To do so necessitates analyzing 
the limitations and weaknesses of the existing theories. What follows in this section is a 
brief introduction of each of the existing three theories on the existence of the firm and a 
more detailed explanation of their limitations and weaknesses. 
2.1 The transaction cost theory 
Transaction cost logic: economizing on transaction costs 
Before 1930s, the neoclassical ‘theory of the firm’ was merely a part of the wider theory 
of value, which was constructed ‘for the purpose of assisting in the theoretical 
investigation of one of the central problems of economic analysis – the way in which 
prices and the allocation of resources among different uses are determined’ (Penrose, 
1959: 11). Due to such a specific purpose, the firm in the neoclassical economics is 
treated as an atomic entity or a ‘representative firm’ that behaves merely in response to 
the price signals. Few economists thought it necessary to enquire what happened inside 
the firm (Penrose, 1995: x) and the firm either remained a black box or had no ‘insides’. 
In a sense, the neoclassical ‘theory of the firm’ is actually the theory of markets. Such a 
‘black box’ treatment would ultimately invite criticisms from those who are concerned 
about the nature and behaviors of the real firms. 
Coase (1937) was one of the first who dared to challenge the neoclassical theory of the 
firm and enquired into the nature of the firm. The question inspired Coase’s theorization 
is that, if the market/price mechanism were so efficient, why did the firm come to exist at 
all? Coase’s own answer is that, there are costs of using the market as well as the firm, 
i.e., costs of transacting and costs of organizing. The firm exists to reduce the transaction 
costs of searching and using market exchanges for everything it needs for production. 
However, there will also be costs of organizing the activities in the firm incurred 
whenever one external transaction is internalized. The firm will tend to expand its size 
until the increase in organizing cost is equal to or greater than the reduction of transacting 
cost. Regarding the issue of internal organization of the firm, Coase argues under the 
employment relationship, the owner of the firm has the rights to control the works of the 
employees by telling them when to work, what to work on and how to do it, in other 
words, by fiat (Williamson, 1971: 114).  
In spite of the ituitive plausibility of Coase’s theory, it did not make a substantial impact 
on the mainstream economic thinking before 1970s, which Coase lamented later that his 
theory was ‘much cited and little used’ (Coase, 1972: 68; Malmgren’s (1961) theory of 
informational transaction cost was an exception). There are several possible reasons. One 
might be Coase’s verbal theory could be hardly put into mathematical forms or in 
Williamson’s (1975) term ‘not been made operational’, as Foss (1998: 9) points out that 
‘Coase had given virtually no details on the determinants of these costs’. So economists 
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would not be willing or able to use it and sometime simply for the sake of publication (cf. 
Coase, 1988: 36). Another reason might be his theory was overshadowed by the 
monopolistic competition revolution in economics led by Chamberlin (1933) and 
Robinson (1933) and later Debreu’s (1959) general equilibrium theory in his Theory of 
Value.  
Entering into 1970s, there began to emerge some serious works on the theory of the firm. 
Among them is a set of important contributions to the so-called transaction cost 
economics (TCE), including Williamson’s (1971) market failure theory of vertical 
integration and his (1975, 1985) asset specificity theory of internalization, Alchian and 
Demsetz’s (1972) team production theory, and Jensen and Meckling’ (1976) nexus of 
contracts theory. In late 1980s there emerged another important branch of the TCE – new 
property rights theory – developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore 
(1990). Although the TCE consists of diverse theories, it has a shared central argument 
that the firm exists to economize on transaction costs of various kinds, such as agency 
cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; cf. Ross, 1973), cost of shirking (Alchain and Demsetz, 
1972), cost of opportunism (1975, 1985), and cost of underinvestment (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), by means of internalization of the market, i.e., the 
substitution of internal organization for market exchange (Williamson, 1971: 112). 
Although Coase’s transaction cost logic is uncommonly insightful and can scarcely be 
faulted (Williamson, 1975: 4), it is not without criticisms. The common criticisms of the 
TCE include: the transaction cost logic is tautological (Alchain and Demset, 1972: 783; 
Masten, Meehan and Snyder, 1991; Williamson, 1975: 3) and only a partial explanation 
(Dyer, 1997; Zajac and Olsen, 1993), TCE researches rely on indirect rather than direct 
measuring transaction costs (Foss, 1998: 16; Masten et al., 1991: 3-4), and the TCE, 
especially Oliver Williamson’s version, is bad for practice (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; 
Hodgson, 2004; Pfeffer, 1994). 
Tautology in transaction cost logic 
Masten et al. (1991) have noticed that there is a tautological formulation built into the 
transaction cost arguments, which is labelled by Barney (2001) as ‘Coasian tautology’. 
Namely, the central hypothesis underlying TCE is that the choice of which governance 
mode (i.e., market or the firm) to choose depends completely on the comparison between 
the costs of organizing under the corresponding alternative. However, the direct 
comparison is impossible for two reasons. First, such costs are difficult to observe and 
measure given some implicit or latent costs exist; second, the cost of organizing under the 
alternative mode cannot be directly observed and measured because once one mode is 
chosen the alternative mode is simultaneously forgone. So, Masten et al. (1991) point out 
that Coase’s original transaction cost argument is easy to make and impossible to refute, 
which can ‘call into questions of the entire edifice’ of transaction cost theory (Ghoshal 
and Moran, 1996: 23). 
Transaction cost is a partial explanation 
Transaction cost theory, by focusing solely on cost issue, completely neglects other 
aspects of commercial exchange, i.e., the value side and the distribution of value created, 
which are two fundamental questions concerning the theory of the firm (Asher, Mahoney 
and Mahoney, 2005). For example, Zajac and Olsen (1993) argue that transaction cost 
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perspective has at least two limitations when used to analyze interorganizational 
strategies: (1) a single-party, cost minimization emphasis that neglects the 
interdependence between exchange partners in the pursuit of joint value, and (2) an over-
emphasis on the structural features of interorganizational exchange that neglects 
important process issues. They propose instead a transactional value framework for 
analyzing inteorganizational strategies that emphasizes joint value maximization. Dyer 
(1997) echoes this view and contends that the fundamental governance question is ‘how 
can exchange relations be structured to maximize transaction value’ rather than ‘to 
economize on transaction costs’? 
Indirect tests in TCE researches 
In order to sidestep the direct comparison problem, TCE scholars have adopted the 
indirect tests apparoach. Foss (1998: 16) notices that ‘formal contributions prefer in 
general not to use the concept [transaction costs] at all (or only in a verbal introduction) 
and to model not transaction cost per se, but rather the manifestations of transaction 
costs’. To do so, as Masten et al. (1991: 3-4) observe, TCE scholars ‘relate the incidence 
of transaction costs to observable characteristics of the transaction and then base 
predictions of organization form on those observed features’, a common strategy is ‘to 
estimate organizational form as a function of observable characteristics such as the 
degree of asset specificity and the level of uncertainty or complexity associated with the 
transaction’. Obviously, this is precisely how Williamson’s theory is developed.  
However, Masten et al. (1991: 4) rightly point out ‘a finding that higher asset specificity 
leads to a larger probability of integration could, in principle, obtain even if the 
hypothesis that asset specificity raises contracting costs were invalid [italic added]’. And 
indeed, the hypothesis is invalid as Dyer (1996, 1997: 536) has shown by the evidences 
of Japanese automaker-supplier keiretsu that, compared with US counterparts, the 
Japanese transactors incurred significantly lower transaction costs even though they had 
made greater asset-specific investments; and more interestingly, the automaker with the 
least specialized supplier group (GM) had the highest transaction costs while the 
automaker with the most specialized supplier group (Toyota) had the lowest transaction 
costs.  
TCE is bad for practice 
The most serious attack on TCE, especially on Williamson’s opportunism-based theory, is 
the criticism of ‘bad for practice’ (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Hodgson, 2004; Pfeffer, 
1994). The critics argue Williamson’s theory is established on false or biased assumptions 
about human nature, i.e., being opportunistic. According to psychology theories, people’s 
attitudes and behaviors are likely to be modified in response to their perceptions how they 
are treated by other people surrounding them. Negative perception derived from mistrust 
due to the opportunism assumption may reinforce people’s opportunistic attitude and 
behaviors through a positive feedback loop. Therefore, the opportunism becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Due to the self-fulfilling propensity of the opportunism-based TCE 
theory, it is very dangerous for management practice to design organizational control and 
incentive mechanisms according to this theory. The irony of the opportunism-based TCE 
theory is that it is likely to cause more opportunistic behaviors that the theory is designed 
to reduce.   
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In addition, Ghoshal and Moran (1996: 23) argues Williamson’s logic that hierarchical 
control can reduce opportunistic behavior is not justifiable because the net effect of 
hierarchical control on opportunistic behavior will depend in part on the relative strengths 
of two distinct and mutually contradictory effect, i.e., formal control can in some 
situation constrain opportunistic behavior and in some other situation can invite 
opportunistic behavior due to lack of trust and negative feeling for the management,  and 
the directionality of this net effect cannot be theoretically determined. 
TCE offers a suboptimal solution 
Besides these above mentioned common criticisms, we argue, the transaction cost 
theories as currently presented have offered suboptimal solutions to the transaction cost 
problem, namely, in order to avoid or minimize transaction costs the entrepreneur should 
internalize the external market transactions; however, we argue, internalization should be 
the last choice rather than the first choice to consider for such a purpose.  
The most commonly conceived transaction costs include costs of searching, 
negotiation/contracting and monitoring/enforcement. To minimize or avoid searching and 
negotiation/contracting/ costs, the first choice should be to design a long-term contract 
rather than internalizing the established arm’s length transactions. First of all, a long-term 
contract will reduce one’s needs for frequent searching alternative suppliers otherwise. In 
situations where periodical searching for better suppliers is conducted alongside the long-
term contract, the newly incurred searching costs can never be avoided and 
internalization is irrelevant. Secondly, a long-term contract will also reduce one’s needs 
for frequent negotiation and hence contracting costs otherwise because what remains is 
less frequently periodical renegotiations of the contract. Thirdly, a long-term contract will 
be implemented as a repeated game that, according to the game theory, will automatically 
reduce the opportunistic behaviors and therefore the monitoring/enforcement costs.  
Internalization may be a wrong choice because we can choose to ‘vote with feet’ rather 
than internalize to punish opportunistic behaviors. Apparently, internalizing or employing 
opportunistic people is a decisively wrong decision to make in the first place because, on 
the one hand the opportunistic people will behave opportunistically whenever possible, 
and on the other hand there are many faithful people in the market so why not searching 
for them? In many cases, it may be more economical to invest extra time for searching 
for faithful people rather than invest in monitoring the opportunistic people? 
2.2 The knowledge-based theory 
The knowledge-based logic: creating positives vs. avoiding negatives 
As Coase (1988: 47) himself later recognized, while his theory ‘emphasized the 
comparison of the costs of transacting with the cost of organizing’, he ‘did not investigate 
the factors that would make the costs of organizing lower for some firm than for others’, 
i.e., the firm-specific factors which give one firm an competitive advantage over another 
firm. Evidently, this omission prevails in most of the economic researches on the firm. In 
response, many economists outside the mainstream economics and scholars of 
organization and management studies have tried to address the question of what are the 
sources of firm heterogeneity or competitive advantages.  
In 1959, Edith Penrose published her landmark book The Theory of the Growth of the 
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Firm. Although Penrose’s focus was on the growth of the firm and the limits on the 
growth rate, she nevertheless laid down the intellectual foundation of what was later 
called the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) (Wernerfelt, 1984) that sees the firm as 
a collection of productive resources. Following Penrose, scholars have expanded the 
scope of the RBV to include core competence view (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), 
knowledge-based view (Conner, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992) and dynamic capability 
view (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997), among others.  
In an attempt to establish an alternative to the dominant transaction cost theory of the 
firm, Conner (1991) argues that we can treat the firm as not only an ‘avoider of a 
negative’ but also a ‘creator of a positive’. Although Conner’s intention was to transform 
the loosely defined resource-based view of the firm into an explicit resource-based theory 
of the firm, she has actually established a knowledge-based theory of the firm (KBT). 
According to Conner, the RBV implies a theory of firm existence that the firm is more 
advantageous than the market contract in inter-component knowledge transplantation and 
in the creation and redeployment of specific assets; in addition, the RBV has an implicit 
theory of firm boundary that turns on the firm’s advantages over the market in creating 
and redeploying specific assets. Although Conner mainly attended to the existence and 
boundary issues, she also offered an implicit theory of the competitive advantage of the 
firm that associates the firm’s competitive advantage to the strength of firm-level linkages 
such as corporate culture and routines. 
About the same time, independent of Conner’s (1991) paper, Kogut and Zander (1992) 
published their own knowledge-based theory of the firm. Kogut and Zander (1992, 1993, 
1996) argue that the firm comes to exist because it is a more effective mechanism and a 
social community with organizing principle for knowledge transfering and generation due 
to the tacitness of much human knowledge and the shared organizational identity. 
Following Kogut and Zander, many other scholars have enriched the knowledge-based 
theory (e.g., Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Madhok, 1996; Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). 
As intentionally proposed as a ‘positive’ alternative to the ‘negative’ transaction cost 
theory for explaining the existence of the firm, the knowledge-based theory as currently 
presented, though being intuitively plausible (Håkanson, 2010), also suffer from several 
limitations and weaknesses, i.e., the conceptual ambiguities, the lack of robustness and a 
doubtful assumption. 
The conceptual ambiguities in KBT 
As Håkanson (2010) points out, there are four ambiguities in the diverse 
conceptualizations of knowledge. The first ambiguity is a definitional one as there has 
been a lack of agreement as to the definition of the central concept of knowledge (also of 
competence and capability). The second one concerns the relevant level of analysis (Felin 
and Foss, 2005; Felin and Hesterly, 2007), i.e., whether knowledge resides in individuals 
or in organizational collectivity. The third ambiguity arises due to the use of highly 
abstract versus more elaborate classifications of knowledge. The fourth one relates to the 
treatment whether knowledge is stable or dynamic. Due to these conceptual ambiguities, 
it is not surprising that Kaplan et al. (2001: 3) contend that ‘the knowledge-based theory 
of the firm seems like a theoretical patchwork than a solid body of theoretical knowledge’. 
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The KBT’s lack of robustness 
Williamson (1999: 1094) and Winter (1995: 149) criticize the knowledge-based 
perspective has an expansion tendency, namely, its theorists tend to commoditize the 
concept of knowledge, capability, resource and routine, etc. to include so many different 
things, which in turn make it almost impossible to ‘breathe operational content into such 
competence features’ which is, to Williamson (1999: 1097), a need for those competence 
perspective holders. In addition, when comparing the governance/contractual perspective 
and the competence perspective, Williamson (1999) critiques the core competence theory 
as lacking of apparatus therefore the theory can only offer ‘ex post rationalization’, 
namely, the core competence theorists tend to say, “show me a success story, we will 
identify a core competence; or show me a failure story, we will specify a missing 
competence”.  
Foss (1998: 19) points out a problem in the knowledge-based theories. Namely, all 
incentive conflict problems are suppressed in order to focus on the costs of storing, using, 
producing and transmitting information and knowledge. This is very unrealistic given the 
undisputable existence of conflict of interests in our economies and societies. Also, Foss 
argues that the competence perspective has largely originated in the outskirts of 
economics such as business strategy, international business, technology studies, etc., and 
therefore is considerably looser than most mainstream economic theories of the firm. If 
they are best for explaining the competitive advantage of the firm, they are not robust to 
deal with the existence and boundary issues although most of the knowledge-based 
theorists often strive to address those issues.  
A doubtful assumption of the KBT 
The KBT has an implicit assumption that putting people together (e.g., in a firm) will 
automatically generate knowledge (and more effectively than the market can). Conner 
(1991: 140) actually explicitly asserts that ‘gains from in-house activity are likely to arise 
whether or not there is a conscious [italic in orginal]...Rather, the existence of gains is 
likely to result automatically from the underlying linkedness [italic in orginal] of the 
firm’s resources and resource conversion activities’. This assumption is doubtful because 
it neglects people’s willingness and commitment as the motivational precondition for 
knowledge sharing and creation. A mere change from market transaction relationship to a 
firm employment relationship does not automatically induce the employed people to be 
willing and committed to share their knowledge (tacit or not) with their fellow employees.  
To address the motivational issue, Kogut and Zander (1996) argue that the firm as a 
social community creates a sense of shared identity that induces knowledge sharing and 
learning among its employees. Although this can be seen as an advancement in the 
knowledge-based line of reasoning, it still falls short of an ultimate answer because 
having an shared identity of being an employee of a firm does not automatically motivate 
a person to be willing and committed to share and create knowledge. For instance, in the 
traditional Chinese practice of apprenticeship, it was often the case that the masters often 
did not teach/transfer their entire knowledge to their disciples but instead held some 
secret parts in order to make themselves superior to their disciples, sometimes even until 
their deaths. Therefore, in the knowledge-based logic, there has been a missing link 
between an employee’s identity of being a part of the firm and his willngness and 
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commitment to knowledge sharing and creation.  
Håkanson (2010) proposes a solution to this problem by conceptualizing the firm as an 
epistemic community that provides superior enabling and motivational conditions for the 
combination and integration of tacit functional or occupational expertise. He further 
argues that ‘the establishment of a firm as [italic added] an epistemic community requires 
transaction-specific investments on part both of the owners, managers, and employees 
which is why these conditions are difficult to create under market and other non-firm 
modes of governance’. This is an interesting argument; however, Håkanson’s theory has 
two weaknesses. On the one hand, being a part of an epistemic community does not 
automatically guarantee that one will be willing and committed to share and create 
knowledge. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the purpose or direction of a firm is 
to establish it into an epistemic community in which members of the community have a 
similar or same cognitive/epistemic background and often possess the same tacit and 
experiential knowledge. In theory, many scholars have argued (for a review, see Jackson, 
Joshi and Erhardt (2003)) that a firm should strive for diversity in its human resource 
management in terms of the employees’ backgrounds and expertises. In practice, many 
firms do pursue such a diversity in their recruitment practices. More seriously, pursuing a 
firm as a homogeneous epistemic community may invite cognitive rigidity and even the 
‘not invented here’ (NIH) syndrome (cf. Katz and Allen, 1982).  
2.3 The entrepreneurship theory 
Casson (2000, 2005) argues that existing theories of the firm are partial theories because 
they have largely neglected the entrepreneurial dimension of the firm. Casson (2005) 
offers two possible reasons for the neglect of entrepreneurship by theorists of the firm. 
One is that, the traditional literature on entrepreneurship, such as Cantillon (1755) and 
Knight (1921), is economic and has little relevance to management of the firm. The other 
reason is that, some of the economic literature on entrepreneurship involves distinctive 
psychological assumptions which though very insightful do not fit with mainstream 
theory. In addition, Foss and Klein (2005) find another reason, namely, many recent 
theories of entrepreneurship, such as entrepreneurship as imagination or creativity, 
entrepreneurship as innovation, entrepreneurship as alertness or discovery, and 
entrepreneurship as charismatic leadership, do not provide a natural links to the theory of 
the firm.  
On the other hand, Witt (1999) points out that ‘theories focusing on the entrepreneurial 
element in the economy, in particular the contributions in the Austrian tradition, have 
paid hardly any attention to the role of the firm’. Therefore, there has been a missing 
chapter on the role of the firm in Austrian economics. Many people have made 
substantial efforts in bridging the theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm, 
resulting in an emerging entrepreneurial approach to the theory of the firm (e.g., Alvarez 
and Barney, 2004; Casson, 2000, 2005; Dew, Velamuri and Venkataraman, 2004; Foss, 
1994, 1997; Foss and Klein, 2005; Foss, Foss, and Klein, 2007; Langlois, 1988; Silver, 
1984; Witt, 1999, 2001).  
The dominant logic in the entrepreneurial approach is that, it is a special type of market 
failure, i.e., the absence of a market for the entrepreneur’s services (Foss, 1993: 136), that 
calls for the formation of a firm by the entrepreneur. In other words, ‘if the entrepreneur 
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could sell the opportunity she has recognized at a price that satisfies her, then we would 
say that a market exists for the opportunity. It is because no such market exists that she 
has to hire herself by starting a firm’ (Dew, Velamuri and Venkataraman, 2004: 669). The 
answer to the question why there is no such a market for entrepreneurial services given 
by Fose (1993: 136) is that ‘there does not in the market exist a way to evaluate the 
entrepreneur’s worth on the basis of his marginal productivty’ as Kirzner (1979: 181) 
contends that ‘entrepreneurship reveals to the market what the market did not realize was 
available, or indeed, needed at all’. Foss and Klein (2005) adopt Catillon’s (1755) 
conceptualization of entrepreneurship as judgmental decision making under the condition 
of uncertainty. Under uncertainty, the other market participants may be unable to either 
accept or understand the entrepreneur’s subjectively perceived means-ends framework, 
which to his or her mind spells out the preferred or ‘best way’ of implementing the 
entrepreneurial idea in the marketplace (I. Zander, 2007: 1142). 
Casson (2005) claims that ‘the addition of entrepreneurship is not a minor refinement of 
the theory of the firm, but represents a radical change’ while Langlois (2005) contends 
‘entrepreneurship, properly understood, is a crucial but neglected element in explaining 
the nature and boundaries of the firm’. However, we argue, the entrepreneurship theory of 
the firm as currently presented has misunderstood rather than properly understood the 
linkage between entrepreneurship and the existence of the firm.  
Our critique of the market failure logic, i.e., there being no market for entrepreneurial 
opportunities, is simple, namely, why should an entrepreneur want to sell his 
entrepreneurial idea or opportunity to others in the first place? According to 
Venkataraman (1997), entrepreneurship is ‘the process by which opportunities for the 
creation of markets for new products and services are recognized, pursued, and exploited’ 
(cited in Dew et al., 2004: 662). This definition implies that a true entrepreneur will 
pursue the entrepreneurial ideas/opportunities once he recognized. The corollary is that if 
one sells his entrepreneurial ideas/opportunities to others for cash, he is not an 
entrepreneur by definition.  
Another way of explain why an entrepreneur will not try to sell his entrepreneurial idea is 
as follows. Even if we assume that the entrepreneur does consider selling his idea, he will 
soon realize he shall not do so, because, even if we assume there is a market or someone 
who is interested in his idea, in order to receive a satisfactory pay for his idea, the 
entrepreneur has to explain every detail of his idea, e.g., what techniques are involved, 
what materials to buy, and how to make the product, or in short how to make money out 
of it; if the entrepreneur is not to explain all the details the buyers may not be convinced 
that the idea is worthy; however, once the entrepreneur has explained all the details the 
buyer may not want to pay because he can just walk away and start the business without 
really ‘buying’ the idea he already knew. Today there is sophisticated market for 
technology, however, long time ago when the first ever entrepreneurial firm was about to 
start, such institutions preventing stealing other people’s intellectual properties, e.g., an 
entrepreneurial idea, were not there. So, entrepreneurs would not take such risks to try to 
explain their entrepreneurial ideas to others.  
Foss (1993: 136, in footnote 12) ironically claims that there is an affinity of his reasoning 
of ‘absence of market for entrepreneurial services’ to Schumpeter’s (1934: 89) 
conceptualization of entrepreneurship that asserts the entrepreneur carries out 
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entrepreneurial activities not by convincing people the desirability of his plan but by 
buying them or their services and using them as he sees fit. Schumpeter’s theory implies 
that the entrepreneur will never consider selling his entrepreneurial idea/plan on the 
market regardless of whether there is such a market or not. In Casson’s (1982: 14) words, 
‘the entrepreneur believes he is right, while everyone else is wrong. Thus the essence of 
entrepreneurship is being different’, which is a Schumpeterian position. Obviously, when 
an entrepreneur gets an entrepreneurial idea, he will not consider selling it to the market 
regardless of the existence of such a market, simply because, for one, if he does consider 
selling the idea, he is not different from other ordinary non-entrepreneurs; for another, 
without an entrepreneurial/innovative idea, he could not make his business different from 
others. 
3. Toward an integrative theory of the firm 
3.1 The need for an integrative theory 
From above analyses we can see that, all the three theories as currently presented have 
some limitations and weaknesses in explaining the fundamental question of the existence 
of the firm, due to which, none of these theories alone offers a satisfactory analysis. For 
instance, both the TCE and the entrepreneurship perspective are ‘single-party’ focused 
analyses that neglect the interdependence between exchange partners (cf. Zajac and Olsen, 
1993).  
Take the TCE first. Williamson (1975) places heave emphasis on bounded rationality 
paired with uncertainty on the one hand and small numbers joined by opportunism on the 
other to explain why internal organization arises to substitute market transactions. 
Williamson’s analysis is single-party focused because it is the entrepreneur/firm in 
question that unilaterally wants to internalize the other party of the transactional 
relationship due to his bounded rationality and perception of other party’s opportunism. 
In other words, what give rise to the internalization needs is the entrepreneur/firm’s desire 
to avoid negative consequences that may result from the other party’s opportunistic 
behaviors that the entrepreneur cannot predict ex ante due to his bounded rationality. 
Likewise, Foss, Foss and Klein (2007) propose an entrepreneurial theory of the firm that 
implies the entrepreneur needs a firm because he can then delegate entrepreneurial 
judgmental decision making to his employees due to his bounded rationality, as they 
argue that ‘such employees are expected not to carry out routine instructions in a 
mechanical, passive way, but to apply their own judgment to new circumstances or 
situations that may be unknown [italic added] to the employer’. 
The problem of such a single-party-focused analysis is that, even if we accept the 
importance of the enterpreneur’s desire to avoid negative by internalizing the other party 
of the market exchange relationship, we still wonder why the other party will be willing 
to be internalized or employed by the entrepreneur/firm if the only purpose of this 
internalization/employment is to help the entrepreneur/firm to avoid negative 
consequences due to his uncertainty or perception of other people’s opportunism? What is 
missing here, and quite importantly, is an analysis of the benefit of such a relationship 
change to the party that is to be internalized. Although the KBT is by design two-parties 
focused, i.e., being concerned about joint value/knowledge generation which establishes 
such a benefit for both parties, the KBT nevertheless has not offered a satisfactory 
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analysis why putting resources/people together will automatically result in synergy effect; 
put simply, there is a missing component of motivational factor in the knowledge-based 
perspective. 
The limitations of the three theories aside, they all have offered some unique insights 
about the different aspects of the firm, i.e., entrepreneurship, cost reduction and 
value/knowledge creation, which are complementary rather than substitutive to eather 
other. In addition, newly proposed perspectives do not exclude the earlier ones. For 
example, the KBT does not reject the TCE logic (Conner, 1991) while the 
entrepreneurship theory was initially proposed as an extension of the KBT (Foss, 1993: 
135). Therefore, it is not only necessary but also sufficient to develop an integrative 
theory of the firm in a particular way that combines some insights of the three theories. In 
this section, we propose such a candidate theory with a conceptualization of the firm as 
an aspirational community.  
3.2 The firm as an aspirational community 
Inspired by Alchain and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose the ‘nexus 
of contracts’ conceptualization of the firm, which views the firm ‘as a team whose 
members act from self-interest but realize that their destinies depend to some extent on 
the survival of the team in its competition with other teams’ (Fama, 1980: 289). Except 
profit maximization, the firm as a ‘legal fiction’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) has no 
other social purpose (cf. Friedman, 1970). In contrast, Kogut and Zander (1996) view the 
firm as a social community with a social function of association because people long to 
belong. Such a social community view is also implicitly supported by Alchain and 
Demsetz (1972) who argue that ‘every team member would prefer a team in which no 
one, not even himself, shirked’. 
Building on such a social community view, we go one step further to conceptualize the 
firm as an aspirational community whose members share the same or some part of the 
aspiration(s) of the organization (initially, of the founder(s)). Such an aspirational 
community can be divided into three parts, i.e., the core, the semi-core, and the periphery 
(see Figure 1). 
The members of the core are those who strongly share the same or most of the firm’s 
aspirations and therefore are the most stable and loyal members of the community. The 
core members are normally the cofounders and the early followers who shared the 
founders’ aspirations but did not invest initial capital for some reasons but latter were 
rewarded the firm’s stocks. The core members act for shared interests and would be 
willing and ready to make self-sacrifices for the shared interests. This can explain some 
political organizations in which the early members are often willing to make self-
sacrifices in pursuit the shared goal/aspiration, even with their lives. The members of the 
periphery are those who share least of the firm’s aspirations. It is likely that many of the 
periphery members join the firm not because of the firm’s aspirations but due to job 
reasons or simply because they have not found a preferred alternative place to work and 
they may leave the firm whenever a more attractive job offer is available. The semi-core 
consists of those people who can be classified as staying in between the core and the 
periphery of the community because they are more stable and loyal than the periphery 
employees while less stable and loyal than those core members. 
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Figure 1: The firm as an aspirational community 
 
 
3.3 The existence of the firm 
Our aspirational community theory of the firm (ACT) offers an alternative explanation of 
the existence of the firm that combines entrepreneurship, transaction costs and knowledge 
generation logics. 
Entrepreneurship under uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a key concept used in transaction cost economics and the entrepreneurship 
approach to the theory of the firm. According to Williamson (1975: 9), ‘the pairing of 
uncertainty with bounded rationality and the joining of small numbers with what I shall 
refer to as opportunism’ can explain the need for substitution of internal organization for 
the market transactions. Foss and Klein (2005) adopt the conceptualization of 
entrepreneurship as judgmental decision making under uncertainty. Scholars have 
identified all sorts of uncertainty in entrepreneurship, for example, Malmgren (1961) 
focuses on the informational uncertainty about the production and price while Foss et al. 
(2007) see the ex ante unknown optimal relationships among heterogeneous resources as 
one type of uncertainty. In a sense, uncertainty has been framed as a perception of 
unpredictability of the external environment (cf. Williamson, 1975: 9). Although such 
uncertainties about the changes of the environmental factors are real ones, we submit that 
the most fundamental uncertainty the entrepreneur faces before and in the early stage of 
carrying out his entrepreneurial plan is that, he is uncertain about whether his 
entrepreneurial business will succeed and often time he is even uncertain about whether it 
can survive tomorrow.  
With the uncertainty perceiption, the entrepreneur may have two distinct attitudes 
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towards working with others, depending on his relationship orientation or regulatory 
focus (Higgins, 1998; Weber, Mayer and Macher, 2011). Namely, if he is pessimistic 
about the working relationships with the other people, for example, suspecting the others 
may be opportunistic, he tends to adopt a prevent strategy to avoid negative consequences; 
in contrast, if he is optimistic, he may see working with others as opportunities, and 
therefore he tend to adopt a promotion strategy to create positive outcomes. When it 
comes to the formation of the firm, there is no way for us to ascertain whether the first 
ever entrepreneur (or entrepreneurs in general) was pessimistic or optimistic, and 
therefore, we can only argue that both situations are equally possible. We will elaborate 
the different possibilities in the following paragraphs. 
Given above analysis, we propose an integrative entrepreneurial model of the formation 
of the firm, which well reconciles the competition between the transaction cost and the 
knowledge-based perspectives (see Figure 2). In our view, the formation of the firm 
normally starts with an entrepreneurial idea or opportunity recognized by an entrepreneur; 
however, due to his uncertainty perception coupled with his regulatory focus, he will 
have a specific attitude towards working with other people (relationship orientation), i.e., 
either pessimistic (prevention-type) or optimistic (promotion-type) or a mix of the two. 
Due to his relationship orientation, he may adopt a strategy of either avoiding negatives 
or creating positives or a mix of the two accordingly; and once he has made up his mind 
and taken actions, the firm is then formed.  
Figure 2: An integrative entrepreneurial model of the formation of the firm 
 
 
It is worth noting that there might be another possibility that the first ever firm was not 
initiated by an entrepreneur but a result of his response to some non-entrepreneurs who 
asked or invited the entrepreneur to start a firm with a consideration of the collective 
action problem that without a risk-taking uncertainty-tolerant entrepreneur none of these 
non-entrepreneurs would not assume such a leadership position.  
Avoidance of transaction costs 
Under such uncertainty, it is troublesome and expensive to use the market for getting the 
labor and capital the entrepreneur needs in order to run his business. It is troublesome 
because the suppliers of labor and capital may be impatient and will frequently ask for 
An aspirational community theory of the firm – Xin Li 
15 
 
payments for their supplies. It is expensive because the entrepreneur has to divert his time 
and energy to deal with these payment issues frequently. Such a diversion of the 
entreprenur’s time and energy is costly because the survival of the new venture in its 
early stage of development often hinges on the performance of the entrepreneur. The 
diversion of the precious time and energy of the entrepreneur, especially during the early 
stage of the development of the entrepreneurial firm, can be viewed as a special type of 
transaction costs for using the market.  
However, the solution to this transaction costs problem is not one of simple 
internalization as argued by Coase (1937), because those impatient suppliers of labor 
after employed by the entrepreneur will still bother the entrepreneur with payment issues 
whenever they see a sign of financial difficulty in the entrepreneurial business. Instead, 
the ACT’s solution for the entrepreneur to deal with this problem is to seek cheap 
supplies of labor and capital. In terms of cheap supply of capital, the first choice is capital 
gathered within his family or borrowed from his close friends; the second choice is 
capital gathered from some like-minded people who share the same entrepreneurial 
aspiration(s); the third best choice is the venture capital while the last one is the bank 
loans. In terms of cheap supply of labor, the first choice is family members; the second is 
the like-minded people who share the same entrepreneurial aspiration(s), no matter if 
they will invest initial capital into the business or not; and the third choice is hiring 
ordinary employees from the market. 
By attracting like-minded people sharing the same aspirations and establish the firm as an 
aspirational community, the entrepreneur can not only avoid such a diversion-type 
transaction costs, but also reduce the traditional transaction costs of negotiating and 
monitoring with these group of people. These people sharing the same aspirations join the 
firm in its early stage of development will be the core members of the aspirational 
community as described above. Due to their shared aspiration and shared interests, the 
core members (especially the cofounders) may make self-sacrifices in order to pursue 
their shared interests. Before the entrepreneurial business makes a profit, the core 
members work together almost like for free, which can be seen as a different types of 
reduction of transaction costs.  
Value/knowledge generation 
When it comes to value/knowledge generation, the KBT has not had a satisfactory 
analysis of the motivation for knowledge sharing and generation. The ACT identifies two 
such motivational factors that determine the aspirational firm will be more efficient than 
the market in facilitating knowledge generation. The first is an interpersonal one, namely, 
within an aspirational community/firm, due to the shared aspirations/goals and the shared 
interests, the core members will be willing and committed to share knowledge with each 
other, which is important for knowledge generation. The second is a personal motivation 
that a person working with an aspiration will tend to be more productive and creative. To 
better explain this, here we make a distinction between contractual labor and aspirational 
labor, the former being defined as services provided by a laborer in fulfillment of a 
contract while the latter as services provided by a laborer in pursuit of an aspiration. The 
argument we make here is that, for the same person, the performance of his aspirational 
labor is in general higher than that of his contractual labor. We explain as follows why 
this is so. 
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According to Hart and Moore (2008) (based on Williamson’s (1975: 266) terminology), a 
laborer can have two types of performance when using his labor, perfunctory and 
consummate performances. Perfunctory performance is the basic performance ‘within the 
letter of the contract’ while the consummate performance is the exemplary performance 
‘within the spirit of the contract’. Because each party of a market contractual relationship 
has the discretion to provide perfunctory or consummate performance depends on how 
well one party is treated by the other. Due to the assumption that only perfunctory 
performance is enforceable while consummate performance is always discretionary (Hart, 
2008: 407) and the hedonic principle that people in general approach pleasure and avoid 
pain (Higgins, 1998), we can argue that, in a market-based contractual relationship, the 
two parties involved tend to deliver perfunctory rather than consummate performances. 
There are two reasons why this is so. On the one hand, the buying party (or buyer) will 
pay the agreed price for the product or service provided by the selling party (or seller) if 
the quality of the product and service reaches an acceptable (i.e., perfunctory) level and 
normally due to self-interest pursuing tendency the buyer will not pay (or will not fully 
pay) the extra if the quality of the product and service is higher than the minimally 
acceptable level (e.g., consummate level). In the latter situation the buyer will gain 
buyer’s surplus derived from the difference between the accepted quality and the 
minimally acceptable quality (or what he paid). On the other hand, knowing that the 
buyer would normally not pay or not fully pay for the difference between a consummate 
performance and the minimally acceptable (i.e., perfunctory) performance, the seller 
would tend to deliver perfunctory rather than consummate labor service (or product) 
because to achieve consummate performance demands investing extra time and energy on 
the part of the task performer who is uncertain if his consummate performance will be 
paid for or fully paid for.  
Another reason why the market-based exchange can hardly induce consummate labor 
services is because of the psychological impact of market-based contracts that are 
commonly prevention-framed. According to Weber and Mayer (2011), a prevention frame 
leads to an interpretation of a goal as a minimally acceptable level of performance 
(something that must be met otherwise it would be unacceptable), which induces high-
intensity negative emotions if the goal is not achieved and low-intensity positive 
emotions if the goal is met. This implies that the buyer would tend to not pay for the extra 
level of quality and the seller would not tend to provide such extra due to the low-
intensity of positive emotions. In sharp contrast, a promotion frame leads to an 
interpretation of a goal as a maximal ideal result, which induces low-intensity negative 
emotions if the goal is missed and high-intensity positive emotions if an ideal result is 
reached. Therefore, while the prevention frame contracts invite perfunctory performances 
the promotion frame foster flexible and creative behaviors. 
From Figure 3 we can see, there are different levels of labor performance associated with 
different modes of exchange relationships due to the degree of shared interests built into 
the exchange relationships. Firstly, arm’s length market-based exchanges are normally 
based on prevention frame contracts because of the lowest degree of shared interests, 
which result in contractual labor with perfunctory performances. Secondly, with more 
shared interests between alliance partners, the alliance contracts often involve prevention 
as well as promotion frame clauses; due to the promotion frame elements the labor 
performances tend to be higher than those of the arm’s length exchange contracts. Thirdly, 
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for those employees of the firm’s periphery, their labor services are still normally of 
contractual nature (with promotion as well as prevention clauses); however, they may 
occasionally pursue consummate performance with extrinsic motivations, i.e., 
performance-based bonus. Fourthly, for the firm’s semi-core employees, they may 
provide aspirational labor on top of his contractual labor because they do share more of 
the firm’s aspirations than the periphery employees do; in addition, they may pursue 
consummate performance with intrinsic motivations, i.e., career consideration or merely 
feeling good by doing well. Lastly, for the firm’s core members, their labor services are 
first of all of aspirational nature while there are also contractual elements involved; 
however, when it comes to their contractual labor services, they will pursue consummate 
performance within intrinsic motivation because of their strong shared aspirations as well 
as the high degree of shared interests.  
Figure 3: The allocation of contractual and aspirational labor 
 
 
From above analysis we can see that, the firm is more effective than the market for 
inducing consummate performance of labor (including knowledge labor), which explains 
why the firm is better than the market in value/knowledge generation. Clearly, the 
performance difference is due to alignment of interests between exchange parties that the 
firm as an aspirational community has competitive advantage over the market in this 
respect.  
3.4 The boundary of the firm 
Organization forms: market, hierarchy and alliance 
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The boundary of the firm is initially defined as a ‘buy or make’ question, namely, whether 
an industrial activity should be organized by the market or within the firm. Although the 
existing literature offers many insights in addressing this question, Richardson (1972) 
points out that the sharp dichotomy between firm and market is misleading because in 
between these two extreme organization forms of industrial activities there are 
intermediate areas where inter-firm cooperation and affiliation may take. The inter-firm 
relationship within such intermediate areas can take different forms such as long-term 
contracts, joint ventures, franchising, strategic alliance, and networks. All of these 
organizational forms can be called as alliances which are hybrids of market and hierarchy, 
in which complex networks of cooperation and association exist. Therefore, rather than 
making a dualism of either market or the firm, we argue there are three broad categories 
of organizational forms, i.e., market, alliance, and hierarchy. 
The hierarchy and alliance can be grouped together as non-market organization forms of 
industrial activities. What distinguishes between the market and non-market forms is 
whether the exchange partners involved have some shared interests or not. In the purely 
market-based exchange case, the parties involved have no shared interests and they fulfill 
the contracts based on purely maximize their self-interests. In contrast, in the inter-firm 
alliance case, although the alliance partners will still prioritize their self-interests, there 
will be overlaps of interests because all parties are aware that their individual success will 
depend on the overall success of the alliance. Such a sense of interdependence will be 
even stronger for the firm employees, even for the peripheral employees. On the other 
hand, as we acknowledge, the peripheral employees share little of the firm’s aspirations 
and may leave the firm whenever more attractive job offers are available, we can see that 
the boundary of the firm becomes blurred because, on the one hand, the relationship 
between the firm and its peripheral employees is not fundamentally different from those 
between the firm and its alliance partners; and on the other, some alliance partners may 
have better and more stable relationships with the firm than the peripheral employees do.  
In our view, we can either treat some alliance partners as members of the firm’s extended 
aspirational community because the firm and its alliance partners sometimes do share 
some aspirations (e.g., co-development of a new technology), or see the firm’s periphery 
members as the firm’s internal alliance partners (in relation to the firm’s external inter-
firm alliance partners) because the primary connections between the firm and its alliance 
partners are temporary interdependence of interests. The question is when and why an 
external alliance partner relationship be changed to internal alliance partner relationship, 
which becomes a ‘buy or have’ question. We argue there is one extra factor to consider, 
besides what the traditional ‘buy or make’ theories suggest, that the firm should try to 
have an understanding as accurate as possible whether the external partner (an individual 
or a firm) in question shares some aspirations of the firm. If so, the internalization choice 
is advisable because when they work together within an aspirational community there 
will be benefits gained from the change from perfunctory labor to aspirational labor. 
Otherwise, the internalization does not make much difference.  What should be avoided is 
to internalize/employ opportunistic people because they will behave opportunistically 
whenever possible no matter what monitoring mechanisms installed. 
The limit to the growth of the firm 
The issue of the growth of the firm is an important aspect of the nature of the firm so that 
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Penrose (1959) devoted the entire book to address it. We argue that the growth of the firm 
depends on how attractive the firm is in relation to other firms on the one hand and how 
capable the firm is to retain people on the other. A firm’s attractiveness derives from its 
aspirations as well as its economic prospects. Two types of people may be attracted to 
join a firm, one being those who share the same or some parts of the aspirations of the 
firm, and the other those who see the economic prospects of the firm are better than other 
firms’. A firm’s capability to retain talented people depends on its capacity to transform 
the firm’s peripherial employees into semi-core employees as well as to transform its 
semi-core employees into core employees. If the firm is lack of transformation capacity 
then the periphery employees may and will ultimately leave the firm and the semi-core 
employees may become periphery employees, and even some core employees may 
become semi-core and even periphery employees. 
No matter how attractive the firm might be, it will not grow indefinitely. Penrose (1959) 
offers one plausible reason why this is so. Here, we provide another perspective on the 
limit of the firm’s growth. When the firm is established with the entrepreneur’s initial 
aspirations, people are attracted by the aspirations to join the firm. However, when they 
join the firm, they may not share all of the firm’s aspirations, in other words, they may 
have suppressed some of their individual aspirations in order to pursue the firm’s 
collective aspirations. With the growth/evolution of the firm, the firm’s initial aspirations 
may evolve too. So, at some points in time, the firm may lose its aspirations, or its 
aspirations may not be strong enough to hold all of the employees together, or some 
employees may no longer want to suppress their individual aspirations, then some 
employees may leave the firm even though at the same time other new people may join 
the firm for various reasons. This means, it is unlikely that a firm can have some 
aspirations that will be attractive forever for everyone in the firm, and therefore, the firm 
cannot and will not grow indefinitely.   
3.5 The internal organization of the firm 
When talking about the internal organization of the firm, Coase (1937) actually only 
refers to the fiat-type authority of the firm/entrepreneur over the employees. Here, we 
will first take on the organizational authority issue and then talk about the transformation 
mechanism of the firm.  
Organizational authority 
The ACT offers an alternative viewpoint on organizational authority of the firm. Rather 
than lean towards either Coasian fiat-type authority or Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) 
view of the firm having no authority at all, the ACT maintains that the owners or their 
representatives (i.e., managers) do have certain authorities over their employees or 
subordinates. But such authority has its limit. According to Simon (1951, 1995), the 
employer’s authority over its employees is restricted to the ‘zones of acceptance’ of the 
employees under the assumption of utility maximization rather than the neoclassical 
assumption of profit maximization (Simon, 1995: 279) where ‘profit [consideration] is 
only one among a number of [considerations] and enters into most subsystems [of the 
firm] only in indirect ways’ (Simon, 1964: 21). And the real authority lies in the capacity 
of the employer, under the precondition of acceptable-quality relationship, to prioritize its 
organizational goals over the individual goals of its employees. 
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This prioritization-capacity-based authority indicates that if the employer abuses its 
bargaining power or if its fiat falls outside the employees’ ‘zones of acceptance’, the 
employees may choose to leave the firm, and then there will be no any authority over the 
employees-to-leave any more. But, if the employer firstly build and harmonize its 
relationships with its employees, then the employer can more easily prioritize its 
organizational goal over employees’ because the employees enjoying harmonious 
relationships with the employer tend to accept the prioritization and authority.  
The ACT also does not prefer the formal control argued for by TCE scholars, especially 
by Oliver Williamson, for two reasons. First, for knowledge workers, fiat-type authority 
and formal control mechanisms tend to have less effects than empowerment and informal 
control mechanisms.  Secondly, in China where relationships and harmony are highly 
appreciated and cultivated, the management philosophy goes that it is not impossible to 
achieve a perfect type of control: governing without intervening, which can be 
understood as the principle of subsidarity, namely, don’t interfere your subordinates, if 
you selected them, trust them, empower them, and encourage their creativity; and then 
they might get tasks done effectively, efficiently and creatively. If leaders at every level in 
the firm follow this ‘governing without interfering’ principle to manage their subordinates 
who manage their own tasks, then the whole company can be governed without 
interference. It may be argued that such a ‘governance without interference’ situation is 
hardly seen in practice. However, what the ACT can shed light on this issue is that, if the 
firm is lead by a clear aspiration and made of like-minded people sharing such an 
aspiration, the more this is true, the more such a ‘governing without governance’ outcome 
will be likely to achieve.  
Transformation mechanism 
The demarcation of the core, the semi-core and the periphery is not static and the their 
boundaries can and may evolve. The core is the most important part of the firm because 
of the loyalties and stableness of its members. However, we should not taken that loyality 
and stableness for granted because the core members may also change their attitudes and 
behaviors if they are not well treated. 
The firm should strive for transforming the semi-core members into the core members 
because, on the one hand, it is much easier for the firm to transform the semi-core 
members into core members than to transform the periphery members into semi-core 
members because the semi-core members share much more of the firm’s aspirations than 
the periphery members do, and on the other, the semi-core members can be turned into 
the periphery members depending on how well they are treated within the community.  
For the periphery members, the firm needs a cost-benefit analysis to decide if it should 
strive for transforming the periphery members into semi-periphery members because to 
pursue such a transformation the firm has to invest heavily in human resource 
management, such as corporate culture and employee training, which may not guarantee 
an expected result. In addition, it is not advisable to have a transformation project that 
aims at transforming every periphery member into a semi-core members because there 
must be some, or even many, periphery members of the firm who do not share any of the 
firm’s aspiration and their reasons for joining the firm might be simply that they did not 
have an preferred alternative so that they chose the firm just as a temprory place to stay. 
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In such a situation, it does not pay to invest in aim of transforming them. 
It is worth noting that the transformation is not an easy task to accomplish. Many people 
join a firm due to economic and career considerations and they will switch to other firms 
if a better job offer or career prospect is available to them. Therefore, it is hard to retain 
those people even if the firm has good corporate culture and human resource 
management system. However, there seems to be a solution to the retention of talented 
people, i.e., the employee stock plan. Giving the employees the entitlement to the firm’s 
stock can be an effective way of transforming them into stable and loyal members of the 
firm because through sharing the firm’s stocks with the employees the firm can establish 
strong shared interests and sense of belonging among its employees. Some people may 
argue that it is an expensive solution as the current shareholders of the firm will have to 
let go some parts of their stockholdings. However, there are two things to consider if such 
a letting-go is worthwhile. One is that there is a cost-benefit analysis because the 
employee stock plan will result in gains from the productivity improvement because the 
employees may pursue consummate rather than perfunctory performance with intrinsic 
motivation after they are turned into stockholding-employees. The other is that there will 
be less capital-labor conflicts that may cost a lot because the labor-employees are now 
also shareholder-employees. 
3.6 The competitive advantage of the firm 
The TCE explains the competitive advantage of the firm in terms of its capabilities to 
reduce or economize on transaction costs (Williamson, 1991a, 1991b) while the RBV 
sees the source of competitive advantage as the value-creating internal resources the firm 
owns and controls. Both views are insightful yet partial as competitive advantage is often 
manifested itself by a superior value/cost ratio, which means both cost and value aspects 
need to be considered when it comes to competitive advantage.  
As it is often argued that the RBV/KBT offers a more convincing account on the 
competitive advantage of the firm, it is worth making a critique of the RBV argument 
here.  
According to Penrose (1959), the firm can be seen as a collection of resources. The 
followers of Penrose further argue that a firm’s sustained competitive advantage (SCA) 
derives from its firm-specific assets/resources that are ‘valuable, rare, inimitable, and 
unsubstitutable’ (VRIN) (Barney, 1991). In the strategy literature, the RBV scholars have 
identified all sorts of SCA-generating resources, such as corporate culture (Barney, 
1986b), organizational routines (Peteraf, 1993), core competence (Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990), causally ambiguous competence (Reed and DeFillippi,1990), intangible resources 
and capabilities (Hall, 1993), human resource management system (Lado and Wilson, 
1994), dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997), and trustworthy reputation (Dyer and 
Chu, 2003), among others. Although abovementioned resources are very valuable, we 
argue, the firm actually does not own any resources and the ultimate competitive 
advantage does not derive from the ownership of resources but the relationship with the 
resource-holders. The ACT submits that the quality of the relationship with the firm’s 
various resource-holders is in turn determined by two factors: the firm’s aspirations and 
its relationship management.  
The firm does not own any resources 
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Lavie (2006) points out that the RBV is based on the assumption that firms are 
heterogeneously endowed with idiosyncratic resources that are owned or controlled 
within their boundaries. However, this ownership and control view is an imprecise 
analysis if one considers the ‘legal fiction’ view of the firm of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), according to whom, most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a 
nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals who hold their resources. 
Here, the individuals involved in the nexus of contracts are the real owners or providers 
of resource of all kinds. For example, the shareholders are the owners or providers of 
financial resources; the employees are the owners and providers of their labors, be it 
manual or intellectual; the suppliers are the owners and providers of materials or services 
supplied; and so on. 
In such a nexus of contracts, the firm as a ‘legal fiction’ does not actually own any 
resources. The firm does not own any employees although it has large degree of authority 
on how to use the labors of the employees. The firm also does not own any financial 
resources because all financial assets are simply equity belonging to the shareholders. 
The so-called retained profits are simply undistributed dividends to the shareholders who 
in turn have the ultimate ownership.  
Arguably, the firm also does not own knowledge as knowledge ultimately resides only in 
human brains that the firm does not own. Although many scholars, following Nelson and 
Winter (1982), have taken a collectivist perspective to knowledge and argue for 
organization-level social knowledge (e.g., Spender, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), no one can deny that, in an extreme situation when the 
entire employment of a firm is replaced by a new set of employees, the so-called 
organizational routines will be changed and become very different from those of the 
original. Simply put, organizational routines are not static but dynamic, depending on and 
evolving with the change of the people who practice them. Therefore, if the firm does not 
own the people who practice the evolving organizational routines, the firm cannot own 
the organizational routines either. 
Ownership of resources vs. relationship with resource-holders 
According to Penrose (1959: 78), ‘the services that the resources’, including physical, 
human, managerial and entrepreneurial, ‘will yield depend on the capacities [italic added] 
of the men using them’. We see two types of capacities here, one being the relational 
capacity while the other the technical capacity. The relational capacity refers to the 
capacity of the entrepreneur or management to maintain a good relationship with the 
resource holders within the firm’s boundary so that the resource holders will be willing to 
work productively for the firm. The technical capacity refers to the capacity of the 
entrepreneur and management to utilize the resources at their full productivities. Of these 
two capacities, the relational capacity is more important than the technical capacity for 
the following reason. If the entrepreneur or management has high relational capacities but 
low technical capacities, the entrepreneur or management can still rely on the employees 
to self-govern their own works; in other words, decentralization under good firm-
employee relationships can still work well. However, if the entrepreneur or management 
has high technical capacities but low relational capacities, then while technically capable 
entrepreneur or management wishes to centralize decision making, the employees may 
not be willing to work wholeheartedly for the firm, and the result will be lower overall 




The determinants of the quality of the relationship 
The ACT claims that a strong aspiration owned by the firm (or its founders) is one the 
two determinants of the quality of the relationship with the firm’s various resource-
holders. A strong and attractive aspiration may be something more than mere profit-
seeking. A strong aspiration may have the power to attract like-minded people sharing the 
same aspirations and transform those who initially do not share such aspirations into like-
minded people sharing the same or some part of the aspirations of the firm. In this regard, 
transformational leaders (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978) are of instrumental importance for the 
tasks of transforming the employees.  
However, aspiration alone may not be sufficient. Good relationship management is 
another important factor. The ACT sympathizes with the argument of the stakeholder 
theory and see good management of relationships with stakeholders as an important 
source of the firm’s competitive edge because good relationships may result in both low 
transaction costs and high value creation (Dyer, 1997; Li, 1998; Dyer and Chu, 2003). To 
maintain good relationships with stakeholders, the firm has to implement a fair 
mechanism for wealth distribution among all stakeholders involved. Only when all 
stakeholders/parties who have contributed to the wealth generation are fairly rewarded, 
they will feel satisfactory and the relationships in question will be in good quality. The 
stakeholder satisfaction is very important for sustainable wealth generation. Take 
employee for example, only when the employees are satisfactory about their employer, 
will they work committedly, productively and creatively as reciprocity. In a sense, the 
employees’ commitment, productivity and creativity are the root source of the 
competitive advantage of the firm. 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
The purpose of the firm 
An understanding of the purpose of the firm will have important managerial implications. 
The ‘nexus of contracts’ view of the firm argued by Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) seems 
to imply that the firm as a ‘legal fiction’ has no purpose other than a connection of a web 
of contractual relationships. The most popular view might be the profit maximization 
argument that views the sole purpose of the firm as to maximize profits for the firm’s 
shareholder. In Friedman’s (1970) opinion, there is no any social responsibility/purpose 
other than maximizing shareholders’ value. 
We do not buy into such an economistic view. Such a profit maximization view is 
unrealistic as Simon (1955) points out that the real behaviors of agents will be satisficing 
rather than maximizing. In addition, such a profit maximization view may have a self-
fulfilling propensity, namely, the more one believes it true, the more he will practice in 
accordance with that view, and therefore, the more he will believe it is true.  
The ACT implies that the firm does have a social purpose of aspiration pursuing, in 
addition to profit seeking. The firm is initiated by the entrepreneur who gets an 
entrepreneurial idea/aspiration or recognizes an entrepreneurial opportunity and then 
starts to pursue such an aspiration through the firm he established as an aspirational 
community that also meets the social needs of people with similar aspirations. If 
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managers of any firm sympathize with this social purpose view, they should try to 
manage their firm in a way to give the priority to the pursuit of an entrepreneurial 
aspiration with a social purpose over the maximization of profit.  
A model of aspirational man 
Scholars have made several models of man, such as ‘economic man’, ‘social man’, ‘self-
actualizing man’, and ‘complex man’. The ACT is based on an assumption that human 
being is an ‘aspirational man’ who, besides other needs, has aspirations or the need of 
self-actualization (Maslow, 1943). Human aspirations may be of economic, social or/and 
other kinds. For many aspirations, it is unlikely that a person alone can realize them (cf. 
Simon, 1957: 199) and therefore the aspirational people do need some aspirational 
communities to be associated with in order to pursue those aspirations together with the 
other people sharing similar or same aspirations. The managerial implication of the model 
of aspirational man is that the firm’s management should also care about whether the 
employees share the firm’s aspirations as well as the other way around, i.e., the firm 
should also care about whether the firm can help the individual employees actualizing 
their own aspirations. 
Economic efficiency 
The ACT claims that, if the market is sufficiently effective and efficient for allocating 
contractual labor, it is less effective for allocating aspirational labor. To remedy this 
problem, the firms steps in to act as an effective mechanism for allocating, i.e., attacting, 
selecting, transforming and retaining, aspirational labor. Both the market and the firms 
complement rather than substitute to each other. The firm will attract people from the 
market, some of whom may share the same aspirations of the firm while some others may 
not. Some of the employees of the firm may become stable and loyal to the firm while 
some others will not for reasons on the part of either the firm or the employees. For those 
people who leave a firm, the market will be an efficient mechanism for them to find other 
firms to chase their aspirations. In this sense, the market and the firms working together 
will be the most effective and efficient system to allocate aspirational as well as 
contractual labors economy-wide. The ACT implies that only when the aspirational 
labors are efficiently allocated, will a win-win-win state be achieved, i.e., efficiency 
maximized at the individual, firm, and economy levels simultaneously.   
In this paper, we have reviewed the existing three major theories of the firm, i.e., the 
transaction cost theory, knowledge-based theory and the entrepreneurship theory and 
highlighted the limitations and weaknesses of each of them. We acknowledge that all of 
the three theories are insightful yet partial because each of them has a particular focus on 
the multifaceted phenomenon of the firm. Toward a better understanding the nature and 
essence of the firm, we have proposed an aspirational community theory of the firm 
(ACT) as a way to integrate the existing theories. We also offer some managerial 
implications of the new theory.  
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i
 Note that although the singular form ‘theory’ is used here, each of the three theories is not a single unified 
theory but a set of various interpretations that shar a core logic. For convenience purpose only, we use the 
singular form throughout the paper.  
ii
 We use shared aspiration and shared vision interchangeable throughout the paper. For convenience 
purpose, we only use the word ‘aspiration’ rather than ‘aspiration/vision’ for most of the time. 
